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INTRODUCTION 
This Article starts with the proposition that most American contracting 
is consumer contracting, posits that consumer contracting has particular and 
even peculiar doctrinal features, and concludes that these features dominate 
the lay understanding of contract law. Contracts of adhesion constitute the 
bulk of consumer experience with contract law. It is not hard to see that 
someone discerning the nature of contract law from a sample composed 
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almost entirely of boilerplate terms and conditions would come quickly to 
the conclusion that contract law is highly formal.  
Within the realm of potentially enforceable deals (i.e., those that are 
supported by consideration and not illegal or unconscionable), modern 
contract doctrine upholds agreements when the parties have objectively 
manifested assent. This is the contract law of the first-year Contracts 
course, and it is, more or less, why contracts existed in the cases Hadley v. 
Baxendale,1 Hawkins v. McGee,2 and Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry 
Goods Co.3 These three canonical cases each involve oral manifestations of 
assent: respectively, the contracts are based on the carrier’s promise that the 
crankshaft would be delivered by noon the next day;4 the doctor’s promise 
of a one-hundred percent good hand;5 and the employer’s response to his 
anxious employee, “You’re alright. Go get your men out.”6 For everyone 
who knows the doctrine of assent, these are relatively easy cases for finding 
contracts, because the evidence suggests that the parties, in fact, 
communicated to each other their agreement. However, these cases might 
startle a large percentage of the nonattorney population, for the simple 
reason that they are oral and not written contracts.  
What accounts for this misperception of contract law? Americans are not 
contract naïfs. On the contrary, most people enter into numerous legally 
binding agreements every year, if not every month or week. These are the 
agreements we make with Amazon, PayPal, Comcast, Apple, AT&T, and 
Visa, to name a few—in other words, these are the contracts we enter into 
regularly as consumers. Consumer contracts share key features: they are 
formal, assent is memorialized (either by signature or by clicking “I agree”), 
parties neither negotiate nor read their terms, and they are almost 
universally enforceable and, when litigated, enforced. This is the contract 
law that individuals encounter every day.  
As such, perhaps we should not be surprised that this is what most 
people think that contract law is. Emerging evidence indicates that most 
people think contracting means signing the paperwork and that contract law 
is about the form of consent rather than the content to which parties are 
consenting.7 This “intuitive formalism” deserves our empirical and 
 
1 (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (L.R. Exch.). 
2 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). 
3 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907). 
4 Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 147.  
5 Hawkins, 146 A. at 643.  
6 Embry, 105 S.W. at 777. 
7 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract 
Formation, 67 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2) (conducting questionnaire 
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normative attention because it has real implications for how consumers 
behave in their deals and how they interact with their legal system.  
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I argue that the doctrines 
around contracts of adhesion have been impervious to the facts of our 
changing contractual culture and that we might think of them as a triumph 
of doctrinalism over realism. In Part II, I lay out the evidence for an 
intuitive formalism, a set of common assumptions that form contracts are 
good prototypes for what contract law is about more generally. In Part III, I 
present a new questionnaire study as part of a larger consideration of how 
formalist intuitions might affect consumer behavior. 
I. CONTRACTS OF ADHESION AND THE NEW OLD DOCTRINALISM 
The question of whether or not we are in the midst of a “doctrinal” 
moment is a complicated one, in part because the answer must first stipulate 
the doctrine being discussed. For example, the defenses to contract override 
the doctrinal core of contract formation, but they are, of course, doctrines 
themselves. If by Doctrinalism we mean rule-boundedness, even rigidity, 
then the duty to read form contracts is a prototypical case. Many 
contractual disputes involve tough calls in which the rule is not 
informative—much less decisive—leaving courts to work through difficult 
questions of equity. But the duty to read is different: contract doctrine takes 
the clear position that individuals are bound by the boilerplate terms within 
their consumer contracts whether they have read them or not.8 
Like other areas of law, contract law makes assumptions about what its 
subjects are like—what they could have foreseen, what they probably meant 
by their terms, and which remedies they would have chosen had they 
specified. This makes some doctrines frustratingly indeterminate. For 
example, how can we decide with confidence what people mean by 
“chicken”9 or whether they ought to know that a delayed delivery will result 
in a whole factory shutting down?10 Perhaps for good reason, these kinds of 
 
studies of commonsense approaches to contract formation to survey intuitions about what the law 
of formations is and shed light on the relationship between formation and obligation). 
8 See SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS § 70:113 (4th ed. 2003) (articulating the rule that ignorance of a contract’s terms is 
not a defense). 
9 See generally Frigaliment Imp. Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960) (resolving ambiguity in the term “chicken” in favor of the defendants who delivered 
“stewing chicken” instead of “young chicken”).  
10 See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (L.R. Exch.) (holding that the damages 
incurred when the delayed delivery caused a whole factory to shut down were not foreseeable to 
the defendant). 
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reasoning-intensive problems are used to teach contract law, a forum in 
which the task at hand is largely about developing good legal judgment.  
 But some of the highest-stakes questions from a policy standpoint are 
clearly about unread boilerplate. The problem of fine print implicates 
doctrines that are remarkably resistant to realistic conceptions of human 
beings and their social worlds. Doctrine—and, indeed, Doctrinalism—is 
alive and well in the context of adhesive contracts. The enforceability of 
unread terms is applicable across the board, across contracts contexts, and 
with almost no exceptions. As Professors Ayres and Schwartz have put it, 
“The duty to read doctrine is contract law’s analog to the assumption of risk 
doctrine in tort law. A buyer who could have read but did not assumes the 
risk of being bound by any unfavorable terms.”11 Whether or not a party 
had the ability to read a contract is essentially a theoretical inquiry, 
uninformed by evidence of bounded rationality or even the limited number 
of hours in a day. 
Broadly speaking, the upshot for legal scholarship of cognitive 
psychology research is the realization that human cognition is a limited 
resource.12 If this unassailable empirical reality has natural doctrinal 
implications for any area of private law, it is surely boilerplate. 
Comprehending fine print requires attention and high-level information 
processing. It is tempting to think that attention is an easy problem to 
solve, insofar as it is subject to the conscious will of the individual. 
Information processing abilities, on the other hand, may be constrained by 
lack of education or intellectual aptitude, factors not in the control of the 
reader. In fact, though, comprehensibility is a problem that has largely been 
addressed or, at the very least, could be addressed with some investment. In 
many contexts—informed consent, credit contracts, mortgage lending—
contract language is calibrated to be readable by consumers with a junior 
high school education.13 Generally speaking, the crux of an unexpectedly 
burdensome term is not a Williams vs. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. situation 
 
11 Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 545, 549 (2014). 
12 Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 101 (1955) 
(“Because of the psychological limits of the organism . . . actual human rationality-striving can at 
best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation to the kind of global rationality that is 
implied, for example, by game-theoretical models.”). 
13 See, e.g., Informed Consent Guidance—How to Prepare a Readable Consent Form, JOHNS 
HOPKINS MED. (Aug. 2007), http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/institutional_review_board/guidelines_ 
policies/guidelines/informed_consent_ii.html (recommending that the reading level of a document 
used for informed consent not exceed an eighth grade level), archived at http://perma.cc/4YLZ-
BYWH. 
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of a dense, complicated text.14 The bigger and more intractable problem in 
modern consumer contracting is attention.15 It is usually true that parties 
could have paid attention to any particular clause or agreement—but it is 
not true that they could have attended to all of the available boilerplate, or 
at least not if they also had to conduct other life activities. As Professors 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider have argued so pointedly, disclosures and fine 
print confront us at every turn.16 They are on the physical products we buy, 
the buildings we enter, the songs we download, the healthcare we consume, 
and every financial transaction we make.  
In the meantime, there is widespread recognition of non-readership 
even within the doctrinal scholarship and commentary. Empirical studies 
and common sense tell us that non-readership is the state of the world.17 
The Restatement comments to section 211, for example, defend the duty to 
read by arguing the (surely empirical) proposition that although “customers 
do not in fact ordinarily understand or even read the standard terms 
. . . they understand that they are assenting to the terms not read or not 
understood, subject to such limitations as the law may impose.”18  
The normative and practical implications of non-readership are deeply 
contested. A law and economics approach claims that as long as some 
consumers are attending to terms, firms will compete on terms and thus, 
terms will not be overly biased toward firms.19 Even a traditional relational 
contracts argument would say that the fine print is irrelevant because the 
parties will be constrained by their preferences to remain on good terms 
 
14 See 350 F.2d 445, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (providing that due to the obscure provision in 
question “the debt incurred at the time of purchase of each item was secured by the right to 
repossess all the items previously purchased by the same purchaser . . .”).  
15 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 647, 687-89 (2011) (discussing the disclosure overload problem which posits that the 
availability of too much information can actually impede understanding). 
16 Id. at 651. 
17 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in 
Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 243 (2013) (explaining that “contracts 
. . . are rarely read by consumers”); Todd D. Rakoff, Commentary, The Law and Sociology of 
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 1235 (2006) (starting from the presumption that consumers 
do not play a role in how boilerplate terms are written). 
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981). 
19 Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect 
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 638 (1979) (arguing that 
“persons who search [for terms] sometimes protect nonsearchers from overreaching firms”). Of 
course, in some contexts, there is scant evidence that any consumers are reading contracts in a 
meaningful way. See, e.g., Marotta-Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 17, at 243 n.8 (citing research 
indicating that only about one in one thousand online shoppers read standard terms).  
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with one another and to avoid negative reputation effects.20 There are also 
theoretical justifications for enforcing unread terms in the context of very 
low-probability readership. Such arguments rest on the notion that as long 
as there is an opportunity to read, consumers may be understood to have 
consented to the risk of the terms.21  
Naturally, this understanding of the consumer’s obligation to discover 
terms has implications for the operation of the unconscionability doctrine—
namely, that it rarely offers a solution to aggrieved consumers. Unexpected 
clauses embedded in lengthy boilerplate are routinely upheld, unless there is 
a legislative response. Take, for example, three terms: universal default 
clauses in credit card contracts, flood exclusions in Gulf Coast home 
insurance policies, and prepayment penalties in subprime mortgage 
contracts. All of these might seem to be hard cases, both because of the 
bargaining power asymmetries and because the terms are outside of what 
the average consumer expects. But as long as the terms were spelled out in 
plain language in the contract and there is a duty to read, the case for 
unconscionability is a very hard one.22 Thus, this appears to be an area of 
contract law in which the doctrine explicitly rejects the challenge from 
social science and chooses the bright-line rule instead. 
II. LAY PERCEPTIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 
Most nonattorneys who participate in contracts do so without formal 
education in contract law. Nonetheless, people do not, on the whole, create 
new forms of promissory obligations or novel formalities. Indeed, most 
people have a general sense of what it means to make a contract—signing a 
document—and similarly, a general sense that the law of contracts is all 
about policing assent to be bound rather than the content of the 
agreement.23 If we think that individuals learn from their environments, 
 
20 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55, 63 (1963) (describing evidence that repeat players in commercial 
transactions preferred to ignore or overlook contract terms in favor of renegotiation in order to 
preserve an ongoing relationship). 
21 See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING 
APPEALS 370 (1960) (arguing that although specific assent may be absent, there is blanket assent 
to boilerplate terms that are not “unreasonable or indecent”). 
22 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 1745, 1754 (2013) (citing examples of sympathetic yet easy cases in which readership is 
assumed). 
23 See David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 
U. CHI. L. REV. 395, 418-27 (2013) (exploring the moral intuition behind lay people’s 
understanding of what it means to be in a contractual relationship). See generally Tess Wilkinson-
Ryan & Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Conflicting Moral and Legal Rules on Bargaining Behavior: The 
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this is not surprising. Most contracts are contracts of adhesion, written to 
cover every possible base and requiring not just assent, but documented 
assent (by signing or clicking “I agree”).24 Indeed, when contracts have 
particularly high stakes, as with the purchase of a home, a notary is often 
required to verify the manifestation of assent.25 The popular conception of a 
court’s role in enforcing contracts is that the judge assesses the evidence of a 
contract’s existence, and, if such proof exists, makes the breaching party 
perform. Yet evidence from experimental psychology and economics 
suggests that legal enforcement is often beside the point, because people 
take their promissory obligations so seriously that they essentially self-
enforce.26 In this Part, I first consider moral psychology as a component of 
realist challenges to contract doctrine and then offer a counterpoint in the 
form of evidence that parties are often surprisingly formalist. 
A. Social Science as Legal Realism 
Behavioral decision research has been accused of being “the new legal 
realism.”27 Karl Llewellyn’s dark observation that “our government is not a 
government of laws, but one of laws through men”28 was a critique of 
judicial decisionmaking that had potentially devastating implications for the 
rule of law. Llewellyn’s view that law is often so open or indeterminate that 
a judge could often choose his or her favorite among different legally 
plausible outcomes led to increasing interest in the features of the judge 
rather than the dispute itself. The judge’s “personality”—presumably some 
combination of his or her preferences, beliefs, and group affiliations—was 
posited as the true source of judicial behavior.29 The original formulations 
 
Case of No-Fault Divorce, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 315 (2008) (studying moral intuitions in the context 
of divorce).  
24 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1173, 1186-87 n.50 (1983) (discussing the meaning of “assent”). 
25 See, e.g., Eason v. Bynon, 781 So. 2d 238, 240-41 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (holding that “[i]f a 
notary public does not witness the signatures of the mortgagors, is not in the place where the 
mortgagors sign the mortgage, does not see or speak to the mortgagors when they sign the 
mortgage, and the mortgagors do not acknowledge to the notary that they executed the mortgage, 
the mortgage is invalid”).  
26 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Incentives to Breach, 17 AM. L. ECON. REV. 290, 306 
(2015) (finding a reluctance to break a contract in both laboratory and vignette studies, even when 
breach was the profitable choice). 
27 See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
831, 834 (2008) (“We believe that much of the emerging empirical work on judicial behavior is 
best understood as a new generation of legal realism.”). 
28 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1222, 1243 (1931). 
29 Id. at 1242-43. 
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of Legal Realism suggested that judicial behavior was either impossible to 
predict (insofar as decisions relied not on the law but on the unobservable 
internal state of the judge) or entirely predictable once the judge’s politics 
were known.30  
More recently, the “new Legal Realism” depends on the systematic use 
of empirical research methods to test the constituent hypotheses of the 
theory of “laws through men.”31 In contract law, while we might critique 
judicial decisionmaking as a function of judicial politics or preferences, 
perhaps the more interesting set of inquiries has been how these laws 
through men operate within private legal decisionmaking. There is growing 
recognition in contracts scholarship that private individuals often make and 
enforce their own legal regimes, from Robert Ellickson’s study of rural 
landowners in Shasta County32 to Lisa Bernstein’s report on 
extracontractual agreements in the diamond trade33 and Stewart Macaulay’s 
descriptions of dealmaking by handshake among Wisconsin businessmen in 
the 1960s.34 But these examples are really just the most explicit and visible. 
In fact, the overwhelming majority of contracts are only nominally subject 
to contract law, because the stakes are almost always much too small to 
make the expected value of litigation positive and, to some extent, because 
existing informal enforcement makes legal enforcement redundant. 
Perhaps because behavioral law and economics has positioned itself as a 
challenge to rational actor theory, many of its best known and most studied 
phenomena focus on the central importance of informal social and 
community norms and internalized moral commitments and preferences in 
legal decisionmaking.35 Psychologists working in this area are often just 
 
30 Id. 
31 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
969, 976-80, 991-93 (2006) (discussing results of the Implicit Association Test, which finds that 
most people have an implicit and unconscious bias against members of traditionally disadvantaged 
groups, and their implications for antidiscrimination laws). See generally Miles & Sunstein, supra 
note 27 (defining the “New Legal Realism” as an effort to identify empirically the sources of 
judicial decisions, and discussing some of the results). 
32 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986) (investigating how rural landowners in Shasta 
County, California, resolve disputes arising from trespass by livestock). 
33 See generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations 
in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (detailing how “the diamond industry has 
systematically rejected state-created law,” and instead “the sophisticated traders who dominate the 
industry have developed an elaborate, internal set of rules”). 
34 See Macaulay, supra note 20, at 58 (discussing how “[b]usinessmen often prefer to rely on 
‘a man’s word’ in a brief letter, a handshake, or ‘common honesty and decency’—even when the 
transaction involves exposure to serious risks”). 
35 See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 
J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159, 167 (reporting, in the context of economics games 
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trying to document that people have preferences for more than material 
wealth or, indeed, preferences for outcomes that do not even appear to have 
any concrete effects on the decisionmaker at all—that is, preferences for 
other people’s outcomes.36 In particular, three strands of findings have 
emerged: (1) social enforcement (reputation effects), (2) reciprocity and 
fairness, and (3) the internalized moral rule of promise-keeping.  
1. Social Enforcement 
Stewart Macaulay brought sociological insights to bear on commercial 
contracting, interviewing a large number of businessmen about their 
contracting practices.37 His findings sparked fifty years of research 
developing a relational theory of contracts. Relational contract theory posits 
that humans engage in exchanges in a social context and that this social 
context encourages, or even requires, particular “categories of behavior”—
namely, reciprocity and solidarity.38 Enormous practical implications follow 
from this rather abstract premise. If individuals care about their 
relationships with their counterparties—especially counterparties with 
whom they expect to interact repeatedly over time either in commercial or 
social settings—it is the norms and rhythms of their relationships, and not 
the law of contracts, that will guide the parties’ choices. As one Macaulay 
interviewee remarked, “You don’t read legalistic contract clauses at each 
other if you want to do business again. One doesn’t run to lawyers if he 
wants to stay in business because one must behave decently.”39 The social 
enforcement theory therefore suggests a very strong role for reputation 
effects and what we might think of as social costs in deterring breach.  
 
demonstrating altruistic preferences, the prevalence of norm-driven behavior in the workplace, in 
property disputes, in tax evasion, in political attitudes, in voting behavior, and in criminal 
activity). 
36 See, e.g., Jonathan Baron, Value Analysis of Political Behavior—Self-interested : Moralistic :: 
Altruistic : Moral, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1135, 1155 (2003) (describing “moralistic goals” as goals we 
have for others and showing experimental evidence that, for example, “some people are willing to 
impose their allocation judgments on others, even when it is clear that the consequences for others 
are worse and that the others do not favor the allocations in question”). 
37 Macaulay, supra note 20, at 55 (“The primary research technique involved interviewing 68 
businessmen and lawyers representing 43 companies and six law firms.”). 
38 Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory as Sociology: A Reply to Professors Lindenberg and 
de Vos, 143 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 272, 274 (1987). 
39 See Macaulay, supra note 20, at 61. 
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2. Reciprocity and Fairness 
Even without external sanctions, however informal, many people will 
choose to perform their contracts out of a sense of generosity or, at least, a 
preference for reciprocal generosity when one’s counterparty has shown 
generosity first.40 This is the finding of the classic “Trust Game,” an 
experiment in which a player in Room A is given money and offered the 
chance to send some of it to a partner in Room B.41 The player in Room B 
receives triple the amount sent and is then given an opportunity to send 
some back to the original “investor” in Room A.42 Defying the equilibrium 
prediction, most of the investors in Room A send money,43 and most of 
their partners send back enough to make a positive return on investment.44 
In the contracts context, this has clear implications: some would-be 
breachers will perform, at a cost to themselves, because they feel obligated 
to reciprocate the trusting or generous behavior of the other party. The 
promisee may have already actually performed, but it may also be that 
performing is a way of reciprocating the original promisor’s generous 
behavior.  
3. Promise-keeping 
Finally, there appears to be a strong moral norm of promise-keeping. In 
study after study, subjects show preferences for performing tasks that they 
have manifested assent to do—and for punishing violators of that norm. 
Macaulay was the first to document this strong commitment to keeping 
one’s word, citing the frequent admonition that a man’s handshake is his 
bond.45 In early public goods games, Robyn Dawes and Richard Thaler 
observed that the form of “cheap talk” most likely to predict pro-social 
 
40 See generally Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental 
Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833 (1997) (exploring reciprocal motivations as they relate to the 
enforcement of contracts). 
41 See Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 
122, 123 (1995) (explaining the rules of the “Trust Game”). 
42 See id. (further describing the game scenario). 
43 Id. at 123 (“The unique Nash equilibrium prediction for this game, with perfect information, 
is to send zero money. This prediction is rejected in our first . . . treatment where 30 of 32 room A 
subjects sent money . . . .”). 
44 Id. at 131, 135 (noting that in the no history treatment, “11 of the same 28 subjects returned 
more than their counterpart sent, resulting in positive net returns . . . . [In the social history 
treatment,] 13 of the same 24 subjects returned more than their counterpart[] sent[,] resulting in 
positive net returns”). 
45 Macaulay, supra note 20, at 58. 
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behavior was the exchange of promises.46 In recent work, I have found that 
subjects are willing to give up substantial payoffs in a lab game in order to 
avoid breaking a deal.47 Similarly, Zev Eigen has found that subjects 
confronted with a clearly unfair deal after they have promised to see it 
through will go to surprising lengths to perform.48 Some contracts scholars, 
most famously Oliver Wendell Holmes, have argued that contracts are only 
a promise to perform or pay.49 In such a world, all contracts are option 
contracts. More recently, Steve Shavell has made a similar argument based 
on data from original surveys, finding that the moral promise within the 
contract is one to perform only as long as performance is efficient.50 But 
there is evidence from a variety of questionnaire studies that many people 
view the promise to perform as a promise to do a particular thing. While 
there may be informal mitigating conditions (e.g., the cost of performance 
becoming unreasonable), subjects rarely view the fear of missing a profitable 
opportunity as a morally valid reason to pay money damages rather than 
perform.51  
B. Doctrinalism and Realism in the Age of Boilerplate 
Given the body of evidence showing greater-than-expected levels of 
performance even when deals are extra-contractual, informal, or just 
unprofitable, we may be tempted to think that the role of contract doctrine 
 
46 A public goods game is an experimental economics game in which players are each 
allocated small sums and then offered the possibility of increasing their payoffs by cooperating 
with other players. See Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Summer 1988, at 187, 195 (“In such groups with universal promising, the rate of 
cooperation was substantially higher than in other groups.”). 
47 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological 
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 663-64 (2010) (discussing subjects’ differing attitudes 
towards breach, depending on whether a liquidated damages clause was present in the contract). 
48 Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Experimental Evidence of Consent, 
Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 87 (2012) (“When subjects saw and 
actively selected the term obligating them to perform the undesirable task, they were significantly 
more likely to perform that task than when they had no such choice and when there was no 
consent at all.”). 
49 O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“The duty to keep 
a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—
and nothing else.”). 
50 Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 460 (2006) 
(“[C]ontracts are to an important extent incomplete promises and . . . the morality of promise 
keeping does not imply that performance should always occur.”). 
51 See generally Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the 
Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (2009) (acknowledging the widely held belief 
that breach of contract is immoral, but arguing that may not always be the case given that 
contracts are incomplete and cannot cover every contingency). 
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in small-stakes transactions is minimal. However, the fact that most 
contracting in America consists of consumer contracts that are uniformly 
contracts of adhesion casts doubt on such a conclusion. This has a number 
of implications for the psychology of promissory obligations. Perhaps most 
obviously, it means that only one party is a natural person to whom it is 
reasonable to attribute psychological phenomena of any description. 
Furthermore, even if we focus entirely on the consumer, we may still doubt 
that the kinds of preferences and norms that inhere when one’s 
counterparty is, say, a local business, would play an important role in a 
contract with a remote, faceless entity—indeed, possibly an entity that has 
already engendered some ill will (e.g., Comcast or Countrywide). In fact, in 
some relatively high-stakes contexts, survey evidence suggests that this kind 
of negative reciprocity has behavioral effects.52 So we might want to 
question the role of informal norms in consumer contracting at least in part 
because it is not always clear how the morality of promissory obligations 
applies in consumer–firm contexts. 
The focus of this Article, though, is not the nature of the parties, but 
rather the nature of the contracting process. If we think that people will 
perform their promissory obligations for reasons entirely apart from legal 
enforceability, it is easy to underestimate the central psychological place of 
a formal contract. In fact, there is a growing body of literature showing a 
rather formal, even rigid, interpretation of contract law.  
1. Contracting is Signing on the Dotted Line 
In a previous study, David Hoffman and I surveyed the general 
population for their views on how contracts are formed, with attention to 
some of the more controversial or esoteric rules.53 We found, not 
surprisingly, that people do not intuit their way to the Mailbox Rule and 
that paying for a good is often identified as the moment of formation.54 We 
predicted, and found, that subjects would find the signing of a document 
particularly salient. What was less expected was that subjects adhered to a 
sort of signature rule well beyond its utility as a heuristic.55 In a scenario 
 
52 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of 
Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1569 (2011) (presenting survey data that shows that 
“moral imperatives of promise keeping or debt repayment diminish when citizens perceive that 
banks are getting away with selfish behavior while ordinary people are being held to their 
promises”). 
53 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 7. 
54 Id. at 17. 
55 Id. at 26 (presenting a tentative conclusion that people view thir legal obligations as heavily 
dependent on formal manifestation of assent via signature). 
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describing a home renovation contract, subjects learned that the contractor 
instructed the homeowner to “call me at my office to accept.”56 Nonetheless, 
when subjects learned that the homeowner, after the initial meeting but 
before calling the contractor, signed the contract while alone in his home, 
they identified the signature as the moment of formation.57 In a test of the 
Mailbox Rule, for which the doctrinal debate is typically over whether 
formation should be at the moment of dispatch or receipt, more than half of 
the subjects chose neither—they chose the moment that the offeree signed 
the contract, before mailing it to the offeror.58 There was such resistance to 
the idea that contracts could be formed without a contract document that 
only eighteen percent of subjects thought a contract had been formed when 
the buyer emailed “I’ll buy [your car]! Can I drop the check off tomorrow 
and pick up the car? $2,000 is fine by me,” and only twenty-four percent 
when the seller replied, “Yes! I’ll see you tomorrow.”59 Instead, they 
overwhelmingly thought there was no contract until the payment had been 
made—after the manifestations of assent.60  
Indeed, the formal fact of being in a contract affects parties’ behavior to 
an extent not easily explained by a rational cost–benefit calculation. Oliver 
Hart and John Moore argued that contracts act as reference points, meaning 
that parties evaluate outcomes with reference to their expectations under 
the contract, rather than the actual status quo.61 This theory draws on the 
concepts of loss aversion and status quo bias, arguing that the moment of 
contract is the “kink” in the utility function. We followed up on this 
prediction with an even more fine-grained hypothesis: that the pure, formal 
fact of contract formation affects behavior irrespective of the contract’s 
practical implications for the parties.62 That is, it is not just that contracts 
reset parties’ expectations (something that any informal deal or promise 
could do), but that the legal contract has a sort of framing effect, informing 
how parties understand their rights and obligations, as well as the costs and 
 
56 Id. at 15. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 17. 
59 Id. at 13-14. 
60 Id. (showing that fifty-one percent of those surveyed believed a contract was formed at the 
time of payment). 
61 Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1, 2 (2008) (“We 
argue that a contract provides a reference point for the parties’ trading relationship: more 
precisely for their feelings of entitlement.”). 
62 David A. Hoffman & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 395, 397 (2013) (“We hypothesize that one of the most important determinants of 
self-protective behavior is whether the promisee considers herself to be in negotiations or already 
in an ongoing contractual relationship.”). 
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benefits of performance and breach.63 We tested this by asking subjects to 
consider whether or not they would be willing to “cancel” an arrangement 
(either a car lease or automobile insurance). Subjects were randomly 
assigned to read that the contract had a trial period before the contract 
kicked in, or that the contract period had begun but that there was a refund 
policy that permitted hassle-free cancellation within a certain period after 
the contract was made. The subjects were more willing to cancel if the trial 
period was before, rather than after, contract formation, even though the 
difference was only the difference between commitment to a revocable 
contract and a revocable non-contractual deal.64 This result suggests that 
there is something about the fact of a legally binding contract—even one 
that explicitly permits breach without consequences for the breaching 
party—that changes how individuals perceive their obligations.  
2. Contract Enforcement is Specific Enforcement of All the Terms 
This intuitive formalism also pervades the commonsense understanding 
of contract enforcement. People think that contracts are enforceable as 
written—and, indeed, they often believe that specific enforcement is 
available and appropriate. One study of enforcement behavior showed 
participants a contract between a health club and a consumer.65 Half of the 
participants were assigned to read a version of the contract with a clause 
relieving the drafter of liability for customers’ personal injury claims, 
including those arising from the health club’s own negligence.66 The other 
half read the same contract but without the exculpatory clause.67 Subjects 
were asked to imagine themselves in the position of a party who had 
suffered an injury, and asked to indicate their likelihood of seeking legal 
advice and approaching the club for compensation.68 Those subjects whose 
contracts included exculpatory clause were less likely to report that they 
would seek redress, even though they did not report finding the contract 
any less fair.69  
 
63 Id. at 408 (“The reference point was the contract, meaning the value of performance was 
judged with reference not to the overall outcome but with reference to the expected outcome 
under the contract.”). 
64 Id. at 418. 
65 Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A 
Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83 (1997). 
66 Id. at 86-87. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 91. 
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Perhaps this literal belief in the promise of the contract helps explain a 
similarly rigid concept of contract in the performance and enforcement 
context. It might not be surprising that many people think that their moral 
obligation under a contract is to perform, not simply to pay damages in the 
amount that would put the non-breaching party in a position as good as 
performance would have done. But what might be more surprising is that 
many people think that performance is legally required—that is, that a 
judge will actually order specific performance, whether on a delivery of 
goods or a routine service contract.  
Indeed, high-salience stories of contractual unfairness abound. The 
subprime mortgage crisis, for example, involved in part a narrative of 
millions of Americans being talked into not only disadvantageous contracts, 
but contracts that were clearly, unequivocally enforceable.70 Whether the 
victims in these narratives are deserving of sympathy or scorn may be 
contested, but there is a clear lesson about the facts of American contract 
law: burdensome, unread terms are enforceable. In this way, certain 
contract law doctrines make their way into the psychology of contract. 
III. VIGNETTE STUDY: EFFECTS OF FORMALITY ON WILLINGNESS 
TO BREACH 
Given our understanding of both moral preferences around contract 
performance and of formalist understandings of legal obligation, it is worth 
asking how the two sets of preferences or intuitions interact. We have 
ample information that there are real social and moral norms that bear on 
contract performance—for example, altruistic preferences, reciprocity 
norms, or personal commitments to promise-keeping. In most discussions 
of moral norms, there is an underlying assumption about the positive 
normative status of altruism and personal integrity. Indeed, these kinds of 
norms, and the related fear of informal sanctions for violating them, might 
actually be the primary enforcement mechanisms for the kinds of small-
stakes contracts most of us make every day. But at least some research 
suggests that increased formality yields an increased likelihood of 
performance, whether because people internalize the solemnity of the 
commitment or because they believe that legal enforceability has practical 
 
70 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1138-39 (2009) (“A recent study found that black borrowers paid an 
additional $415 in fees and Latino borrowers paid an additional $365 in fees. . . . Borrowers with 
less income and education are less likely to know their mortgage terms, implying greater 
underestimation of deferred or hidden costs and a diminished ability to effectively shop for better 
terms.”). 
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consequences to their choices. Oddly, the formality of our contracts is not 
necessarily associated with the attendant stakes. A homeowner might 
reasonably prefer an oral contract for a $20,000 home renovation if she has 
reason to trust her contractor and to worry that formalization will make 
their interactions more stilted. By contrast, the contract that accompanies 
an iTunes purchase covers every possible base in writing. Indeed, it is fairly 
obvious that contract formality is about the parties, and not the stakes 
involved. When a firm is involved in a deal, even a very small deal, there 
are standard terms and a record of the parties’ assent to those terms. Given 
the thread of formalism we see across contracts contexts, it also seems 
reasonable to suspect that formalities up the moral ante—that is, that 
formalities have behavioral effects. 
An original study reported below tested the idea that the formalist 
tendency affects how parties feel about their contracts. In this scenario, 
subjects were asked to imagine that they were party to either a verbal or a 
written contract. They were then asked what financial incentive they would 
require to back out of the contract. The prediction was that subjects who 
were part of a more formal contract would feel more bound and would 
therefore require a greater financial incentive to back out, even though the 
degree of formality had no practical bearing on the consequences of 
cancellation.  
Each of these scenarios, in both conditions, included language 
explaining that the contract was not binding until a waiting period had 
passed. This approach allowed subjects’ behavioral and/or moral intuitions 
to be evaluated without implicating their (mis)understandings of actual 
contract penalties and remedies. 
In this study, subjects read a short vignette under one of two conditions, 
Signature or No Signature, and answered follow-up questions. The subjects 
read the following scenario: 
Please imagine that you have a motor boat that you would like to sell. It 
is parked in your driveway with a For Sale sign, but you’ve had very little 
interest. You decide to try to sell it on Craigslist.  
On Craigslist, you list the asking price as “$12,500 or best offer.” After a 
few days of listing the boat, you have an interested buyer. He comes and 
looks at the boat and offers you $12,000. You agree.  
Signature Condition only: the two of you sign an agreement of sale. 
For sales of large vehicles like cars and boats, there is then a state          
mandated three-day “waiting period.” Once the parties have negotiated a 
deal and signed an agreement of sale [reached a verbal agreement] they 
must wait three days before completing the transaction. During the waiting 
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period, either party may cancel the transaction with no penalty. After the 
waiting period, if neither party has backed out, [the parties sign the sales 
contract, and] the buyer pays in full and picks up the vehicle. 
Subjects then answered three questions: 
1. While you are waiting out the three-day waiting period, someone 
rides by your yard and sees the boat with its For Sale sign still in the window, 
and makes an offer of $12,500 for the boat. The three-day waiting period has 
not expired. Would you cancel the deal with the Craigslist buyer? 
2. What is the lowest offer that you would accept to cancel with the 
Craigslist buyer and go with the new buyer? For example, would you go 
with a new buyer if they were offering $15,000? What about $12,100? What is 
the lowest price that the new buyer could offer such that you would prefer 
to go with them instead of the Craigslist buyer? 
3. To what extent do you think it would be morally wrong to cancel 
with the Craigslist buyer? 
Table 1: Summary of Results, Study 3, Effect of Signing on Willingness 
to Accept Alternate Offer 
 Signed Contract Verbal Contract 
Median WTA $13,500 $13,000 
Mean WTA $14,168.58 $13,467.27 
Wrongness (7-point scale, 
1=not immoral at all; 
7=very morally wrong) 
4.1 3.9
 
In the Signed Contract condition, 30.3% of the subjects said that they 
would cancel the deal with the Craigslist buyer. Where the formal contract 
was not yet signed, 44.0% of subjects would cancel for the higher offer. This 
difference is significant (t=1.997, df=185.57, p=.0473).71 
On the free response question, all responses over $25,000 were omitted 
as outliers. The mean and median responses were significantly higher in the 
Signed Contract condition than in the Verbal Contract condition (W=3497, 
 
71 Under the Uniform Commercial Code’s statute of frauds, the seller’s signature would be 
required to enforce the deal. U.C.C. § 2-201 (2014). However, under both conditions it was 
stipulated that the parties were allowed to back out, so this contingency should not have affected 
subjects’ behavior, even if they knew of the rule. 
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p=.0139). There was no difference in the perceived wrongness of 
cancellation by condition.  
IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The results show that signing a formal contract made subjects less 
willing to exit the deal in favor of another more lucrative partnership, even 
though the signature had no legal force or meaning. For psychologists, 
explaining why formalities make people feel more bound is the most 
pressing among the open questions in intuitive formalism. It could be an 
essentially other-regarding heuristic—the ritual of the formalities 
communicates to the other party an increased likelihood of performance, 
prompting more reliance and, in the event of breach, greater 
disappointment. Or, it could be that the rituals have internalized meaning, 
and that signing documents is understood to be an almost sacred act. The 
mechanism remains unclear and deserves further experimental attention. 
For law and policy scholars, though, the behavioral result alone might 
raise concerns. In particular, increased formalization may have 
disadvantageous behavioral implications for consumers. Because many 
people take formal contracts seriously, firms may be able to leverage 
formalization in order to minimize the likelihood that consumers will exit 
bad deals or complain about bad terms—that is, they will fail to punish 
firms for their bad contracting behavior. Terms that stand on shaky legal 
ground—forbidding class actions or imposing penalties for termination, for 
example—may go unchallenged as a practical matter because the dominant 
view of contract doctrine is that it is all about the formalization of deals, not 
the substance of those deals. The persistence of contract doctrine in the face 
of strong, empirically based policy objections is arguably at its starkest in 
the context of contracts of adhesion. This happens at two levels: the level of 
courts and the level of consumers. As Ben-Shahar and Schneider observed, 
the popularity of disclosure regimes has been essentially unsullied by the 
reality that disclosures serve virtually no informational purpose.72 But this 
does not mean that disclosures have no effect; in fact, disclosures are very 
effective in protecting firms from litigation.73 Behavior that would 
otherwise give rise to liability can effectively be disinfected by way of a 
disclosure.  
 
72 See generally Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 15 (exploring “the spectacular prevalence, 
and failure, of . . . mandated disclosure”). 
73 See id. at 739 (“[A]n empty but formally correct disclosure can keep the contract from 
being unconscionable, however problematic its terms.”). 
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Finally, the formalist tendency can work against consumers in a less 
obvious way, namely that consumers themselves tend to take a surprisingly 
strong strict-liability stance when it comes to unread terms. In a previous 
study, subjects were asked to consider an unfortunate (or hapless, 
depending on your attitude) consumer who agreed to a credit card contract 
and later learned that the terms included a fee for online payments.74 The 
consumer was unhappy and regretted the deal.75 Subjects were randomly 
assigned to read one of two variations of the fact pattern, either that the 
contract was two pages long or that it was fifteen pages long.76 Participants 
were then asked, among other things, the extent to which readership was a 
reasonable expectation and the extent to which the consumer was to blame 
for his own misfortune.77 Subjects in the long contract condition 
overwhelmingly thought it was unreasonable to expect anyone to read the 
contract, while subjects in the short contract condition thought it was 
moderately reasonable.78 The two groups did not differ at all, however, on 
the blame measure.79 In both groups, the large majority (over eighty 
percent) agreed that the consumer was to blame for his situation.80 This is 
very much in line with Stolle and Slain’s finding that subjects did not 
differentiate between the fairness of a contract that was highly 
disadvantageous to the consumer and one that was reasonably equitable.81 
The fact of assent seems, for the average consumer, to cleanse the 
transaction—to press the reset button, morally as well as legally.  
These misconceptions about contract doctrine may actually be a part of 
the story of the New Doctrinalism. There is an argument to be made that 
the lay understanding of contracts as enforceable as written provides a fairly 
accurate approximation of what individuals can expect from the legal system 
if they want to enforce a contract after breach. They may imagine that the 
likelihood of a successful claim in contract is very low if there is a dispute 
about whether a contract ever existed or over its content—in other words, 
they may correctly surmise that they would fare better in court with proof 
of the deal. Indeed, they may be intuiting their way to the Statute of 
 
74 See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 22, at 1763 (explaining the experiment). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1764. 
79 Id. at 1764-65. 
80 Id. 
81 See Stolle & Slain, supra note 65, at 91 (finding that “the presence of an exculpatory clause” 
deterring consumers from pursuing their legal rights “did not impact [study] participants’ 
perceptions of fairness of the contracts”). 
  
2128 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 2109 
 
Frauds. However, evidence from previous studies shows that subjects view 
even email assent as insufficient to form a contract, even though email 
communications are surely capable of being brought into court as evidence. 
Furthermore, it appears that subjects focused on form often insist on the 
wrong formalities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the requirement of 
consideration—which certainly affects legal enforceability—sometimes 
comes as a surprise.82 Option contracts, for example, require ritualized 
consideration (nominal consideration, a recital of consideration, or a recital 
of nominal consideration),83 but this particular formality is not an obvious 
one to most consumers.  
Consumers’ other formalist tendency is to understand contract law as 
being about how to make and perform deals rather than which deals to 
make. There exists evidence in various contexts that consumers believe they 
are bound to terms that would clearly be unenforceable. Take Carnival 
Cruise Lines v. Shute, for example, a case in which cruise ship passengers 
paid for tickets before the terms and conditions arrived.84 When the terms 
arrived, they included the particular forum selection clause at issue in the 
case, as well as a no-refund provision.85 The Supreme Court suggested 
dismissively that the no-refund clause was not enforceable and that it 
therefore had no bearing on the forum selection question.86 But the dissent 
was somewhat more realistic about consumer psychology, arguing that the 
average consumer would believe the refund clause applied and would 
therefore fail to return the tickets even if the terms were unacceptable.87  
When examining research gathered under the heading of intuitive 
formalism, two dominant themes emerge. First, the popular conception of 
contract formation is largely concerned with highly ritualized 
documentation of assent (i.e., signing papers).88 Second, there appears to be 
a view that the primary purpose of contract law is policing the form, rather 
 
82 This phenomenon may be observed in the highly formalized documents featured in a first-
year contracts course’s section on promissory estoppel. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 
1898), for example, features a written and signed promissory note but no pretense of 
consideration.  
83 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87 (1981) (“An offer is binding as an 
option contract if it is in writing and signed by the offeror, [and] recites a purported consideration 
for the making of the offer . . . .”). 
84 499 U.S. 585, 587 (1991). 
85 Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 595 (“[R]espondents have conceded that they were given notices of the forum provision 
and, therefore, presumably retained the option of rejecting the contract with impunity.”). 
87 Id. at 597 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
88 Wilkinson-Ryan & Hoffman, supra note 7 (finding that participants in questionnaire 
studies largely identified the moment of contract formation as the time of signing a written 
document). 
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than the content, of agreements.89 In other words, that the role of courts in 
contract disputes is to determine whether the parties took the right steps to 
bind themselves and, if they did, to enforce the obligations to which the 
parties assented.  
CONCLUSION 
New doctrinalism is essentially a broad and possibly unfalsifiable 
hypothesis: that legal realism did not defeat legal doctrine, but rather that 
modern courts accommodate at least some of the most compelling forms of 
realist methods. Lay misconceptions about contract doctrine may actually 
be a part of the story of this new doctrinalism. It is possible that the lay 
understanding of contracts as enforceable forms is in fact a good distillation 
of what individuals can expect from the legal system if they want to enforce 
a contract after breach.  
Ending the analysis here would be perfunctory, though, because in many 
cases, people get the formalities quite wrong. Consideration, for example, is 
of paramount importance in common law courts—in option contracts, for 
instance, consideration matters more than the formality of documentation—
but common sense may rank them in the reverse order. In the meantime, 
there is growing recognition that both law and legal practice contribute to 
legal intuitions, and those intuitions, in turn, affect a whole range of 
behaviors that exist outside the legal system.  
 
89 See, e.g., id.; Stolle & Slain, supra note 65. 
